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THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL SUBSIDIES ON
STATE FUNCTIONS
Thomas A. Gilliam*
I. HISTORICAL IMPACT
1923 may serve as an introductory year to this subject. Then,
as now, it was complained that federal subsidies are invasions
upon the traditional power of the states in the American federal
system. In that year, however, Massachusetts v. Mellon1 was de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court. This decision involved
two actions, one instituted by a Harriet Frothingham as a taxpayer,
and the other, by the state of her residence on behalf of other of
its citizens to restrain the government from making payments to
any state under the Sheppard-Towner Act, federal legislation en-
acted in 1921 for maternal and child welfare. 2 The plaintiff tax-
payer alleged that the effect of the statute would be to take her
property, under the guise of taxation, without due process of law.
In addition, the plaintiff state asserted that the appropriations pro-
vided by the act fell unequally among the several states, and that
the act was an attempted exercise of the power of local self-
government reserved to the states by the tenth amendment.3 The
Court, by Justice Sutherland, however, not only declined jurisdic-
tion in the taxpayer's case on the ground that her interest was too
remote, but also declined jurisdiction in the state's case, as follows:
In the last analysis the complaint of the plaintiff state is brought
to the naked contention that Congress has usurped the reserved
powers of the several states by the mere enactment of the statute,
though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done without
their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is thus pre-
sented, is political, and not judicial in character, and therefore is
not a matter which admits of the exercise of the judicial power.4
* B.A. 1941, Columbia; LL.B. 1948, Yale; M.A. 1949, University of Col-
orado; member of the American, Colorado and Denver Bar Assns.;
Assistant City Attorney for the City and County of Denver, Colorado.
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
2 42 Stat. 224 (1921). Payments were made on a matdhing basis with
a state accepting the provisions of the legislation.
3 Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra' note 1, at 479.
4 Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 1, at 483.
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Thus it was indicated that the tenth amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States, to the effect that "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people", would not be a hindrance where a state consented
to Congressional sharing of taxes in a traditional area of local
determination. This mitigated then the position taken by the
Court only shortly before in the Child Labor Cases,5 wherein
federal legislation directed against such labor without reliance
on the states, but based upon the Congressional powers to regulate
commerce6 and to tax for the general welfare,7 was struck down
as invading the reserved power of the states. For it was apparent,
under Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra, that Congress could legislate
indirectly as to matters within the orbit of the tenth amendment,
if it could not do so directly.
A. CoRwiLkN ViEWPoiNT
In reaching this view it is of course impossible to determine
how much the Court was aware of the writings of that year.8
However, one very famous student, Edward S. Corwin, had criti-
cized9 not only this challenge by Massachusetts to the constitution-
ality of the Sheppard-Towner Act but also the Child Labor Cases,
supra,10 as resulting from a limited appreciation of the power of
5 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
6 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
8 Burdick, Federal Aid Legislation, 8 CORNELL L.Q. 324, 325 (1923),
pointed out that any attempt at delegation by states of their power
to the government, was, at most, an infringement of a state and not
of the federal constitution. (Cf. Sutherland, separate opinion in
Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 610, note 27 infra).
Another writer anticipating "Cooperative Federalism," note 32 infra,
defined every federal state as an experiment, "a workable adjustment
between the central and the local," THOMPSON, FEDERAL CEN-
TRALIZATION 3 (1923). See Merrill, The Function of the States
Today-A Tentative Blueprint for Federation in Twentieth Century
America, 30 IOWA L. REV. 169, 170 (1945).
9 Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Appropos, The Maternity
Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1923).
10 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., and Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra
note 5. The former case held that Congress could not under the
guise of taxation regulate directly in an area reserved to the states
and the latter case held that the commerce power did not extend
to the same area.
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Congress to legislate for the general welfare," the definition of
which, he urged, is what Congress finds it to be.12  Only briefly
did Corwin treat s upon the consent feature of the Sheppard-
Towner Act, as opposed to direct action by Congress; in fact, in
his historical illustration to prove his point on just how broad the
scope of the congressional power was, he deprecated, although
admitting the existence of, the element of state consent. For after
citing President Washington's recommendations in his final mes-
sage to Congress for manufactures on public account, for the es-
tablishment of a national university,1 4 and for the promotion of
agriculture to demonstrate that it was early assumed that Congress
could directly legislate on problems of welfare, Corwin neverthe-
less, continued:
A few months later the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were
promulgated, the theory of which was essentially that the Con-
stitution, being a compact of sovereign states, reserved to the lat-
ter a mediating function between the people and the national
government. It followed of course that the national government,
before undertaking within the boundaries of the states any new
or unaccustomed activity, must secure their consent. Indeed it
was insisted that the 'necessary and proper' clause implied this
requirement, since no matter how necessary a measure might
be as a means to a constitutional end, propriety required that the
state or states most immediately concerned should be consulted.
... Thus from the outset the question of 'internal improve-
ments' . . became involved with the doctrine of 'state con-
sent.' . .15
Whether or not the Court was aware, however, of the Cor-
winian viewpoint, Massachusetts v. Mellon was in line with what
had been a rich tradition of historical interaction of the states and
the federal government, a tradition which Professor Corwin had
noted above. For as early as 1785 under the Articles of Confed-
11 While observing that the Welfare Clause was not an independent
grant of power but a qualification of the taxing power, Corwin never-
theless urged, citing Story, that the congressional ability to tax, so
qualified, was not- confined to or in aid of the other enumerated powers,
36 HARV. L. REV., op. cit. supra, note 9, at 552-554.
12 Id. at 580.
13 Id. at 580-582.
14 Washington's will also contained a bequest, consisting of stock in a
Potomac company, to the United States for the establishment of such
university. This did not receive the approval of Congress, however,
and no steps were taken to carry out this provision. Roberts, Dede-
velopment of Federail Aid to Education, 30 IOWA I. REV. 210, 211
(1945).
15 36 HARV. L. REV. op cit. supra, note 9, at 556.
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eration, Congress had provided that a section of every township
in the federal domain be set aside for the maintenance of public
schools, and after the Constitution was adopted, the states had
become so obligated in debt, mainly incurred in the prosecution
of the Revolutionary War, that Congress, at the instance of Alex-
ander Hamilton, had assumed these debts. In the 130's the United
States distributed its surplus revenues so as to aid the states which
had been again overwhelmed, this time because of internal im-
provements. In addition, upon admission to the Union, new states
were given land for aiding common schools, universities, normal
schools, schools of mines, flood control, wagon roads, canals, and
river navigation. Even the land grants to the railroads were
initially channeled through the states, although later going direct-
ly to the public carriers. The impact, of course, of these early
unconditional subsidies was of course to enable the states to func-
tion at all.
B. FiRST MODERN CONDITIONAL GRANT
The first modern conditional grant, of a type such as was
before the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra, be-
came law while the Civil War was yet in progress. This was the
Morrill Act of 1862, enacted for the establishment of agricultural
and mechanical colleges. 17 Among other conditions such as annual
reports and direction as to the investment of funds, it was provided
that such funds could not be used for buildings, thus insuring that
the states accepting such benefits must also invest.' 8 The effect
of such legislation was as follows:
The system of public support, assured for technological and agri-
cultural education by the Morrill Act of 1862, rapidly became the
keystone of all higher education in the Midwestern, Rocky Moun-
tain and Far Western regions. Lacking the colleges and univer-
sities of private endowment traditional in the East, the West built
its collegiate and university structure, for cultural and vocational
training, upon the base of state and federal aid.19
16 These early grants are summarized in the COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL
GRANTS-IN-AID (1949), at 1-4.
'7 12 Stat. 503, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, 307, 308. Mr. Charles K. Burdick
had filed for the Association of Land Grant Colleges, a brief as amicus
curiae in Massachusetts v. Mellon. Also see note 8 supra.
18 Ibid., § 305.
19 Wecter, Instruments of Culture on the Frontier, 36 Yale L. J. 256
(1947), as noted in Report, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 4. The first
Morrill Act, July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 503 (1862), now appears in 7 U.S.C.
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And prior to 1914, the principal expansion of the conditional
aid program was in connection with these colleges such as the
second Morrill Act, the Hatch Act and the Adams Act, legislation
which provided cash grants conditional upon compliance with
federal standards and audits. The Hatch and Adams Acts estab-
lished the agricultural experimental stations, a matter so important
to state activity that, stimulated by grants from the Rockefeller
Foundation, a system of "county agents" sprang up around the
country.20 In 1914, the Smith-Lever Act was enacted providing
for cooperative agricultural extension work between the land-grant
colleges and the Department of Agriculture, and contained such
measures as 50-50 matching, an apportionment formula of distribu-
tion of funds between states, and advance approval of state plans
by the government. Thus all the essentials of the American sub-
sidy system were established by 1914.21 It may be also noted here
that, in the previous year the sixteenth amendment was adopted
by the states permitting the federal income tax to be established.
This was later to become an important factor in favor of federal
subsidy, for the alternative to grants-in-aid in the financing of
the major improvements of counties and cities, the political sub-
divisions of the states, is local bonds, repayable ultimately from
property, sales and excise taxes; whereas, federal bonds will be
repaid from national income.22 By 1914 then, not only was the
structure of subsidy established but by that time the industrial
and commercial economic system had made obsolete the system
of taxation based primarily upon real estate.23
One of the basic demands of the new industrialism was of
course adequate highways. Each state was required to create a
highway department under the Federal Aid Road Acts of 1916 and
1921,24 under which there resulted an enormous program of de-
§§ 301-305, 307, 308 (1958). The second Morrill Act, Aug. 30, 1890,
26 Stat. 417 (1890), 7 U.S.C. §§ 321-326, 328 (1958), contains a re-
striction as to social discrimination, 7 US.C. (1958) § 323, but per-
mitted application of the "Separate but equal" doctrine, Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S 537 (1896).
20 Report, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 5. Now 7 U.S.C. §§ 361-389 (1958).
21 Id., 6. The general provisions relating to agricultural extension work
now appear in 7 U.S.C. §§ 341-348 (1958).
22 See BITTERMANN, STATE AND FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID, at
130-1 (1938).
23 Id. at 12.
24 Act of July 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 355; Act of Nov. 9, 1921, 42 Stat. 212,
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-131 (1958).
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velopment considering that the states matched the federal funds.
The impact on state functions? In 1928, state officials, who ad-
ministered federal aid, replied affirmatively to a questionnaire
as follows:
1. How federal grants stimulated state activity
with respect to the aided programs? 90.9%
2. Has federal supervision improved state
standards of administration and service? 68.6%
3. Has federal aid led to federal interference
in state affairs? 6.1%2r
Despite the excellent results of the evolved method of sharing tax
receipts, the depression intervened, and due to the inability of
the states to contribute their share, matching funds for highways
for that interim was discontinued. Then finally in 1937 most of
the depression relief activity began to be undertaken by the direct
operation of the federal government without reciprocal arrange-
ment with the states.2 6
II. THEORETICAL IMPACT OR COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
1937 becomes the next focal year then in this discussion, a
year in which the same events which had produced Massachusetts
v. Mellon, supra, which sustained in 1923 the constitutionality of
the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, were repeated to produce two
new Supreme Court decisions, Steward Machine Company v. Da-
vis,2 7 and Helvering v. Davis,2s this time sustaining the constitu-
25 Report of the Committee on Federal Aid to the States of the National
Municipal League, NAT'L MUNIC. REV. (Supp. Oct. 1928, Vol. XVIII,
No. 10).
26 Report, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 33.
27 301 U.S. 548 (1936). This case upheld the validity of Title IX of the
Social Security Act, note 29 infra. Although Justice Sutherland, who
spoke for the Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, note 1 supra, wrote
a separate opinion, he concurred, id. 609, with most of what was said
in the majority opinion written by Justice Cardozo, who answered
the attack made on the Act as being violative of the tenth amend-
ment, that the state had consented, id. 589. The state's unemploy-
ment compensation law was upheld in Carmichael v. Southern Coal
& Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1936), decided the same day.
28 301 U.S. 619 (1936). This case did not involve grants-in-aid but re-
lated to the old age insurance feature of the Social Security Act. The
act was therefore sustained not merely because of its reciprocal pro-
visions with reference to the states but on the ground that unemploy-
ment is a general national ill which Congress may check by the na-
tion's resources under the general welfare clause and because of the
states' lack of resource and their reluctance to increase the tax burden.
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tionality of the Social Security Act of 1935, federal legislation
which, while mainly containing features of federal-state reciprocity,
also involved direct action by the government as well.29  Again,
just as before in the Child Labor Cases, supra,30 the Supreme Court
had previously handed down recent decisions31 which had again
thrown doubt on the government's ability to legislate directly as
to matters thought traditionally reserved to the states. And again,
Professor Corwin wrote in defense of the Congressional legislation,
this time asserting that the Social Security Act was valid under
a theory of federal-state cooperation as follows:
Cooperation between the National Government and the states in
the legislative field rests, likewise, upon the voluntary principle
in-the main, can rest on no other. Such cooperation takes two
forms: First, the national legislative power, particularly that
over commerce and communications, is exerted in aid of state
policies; secondly, the national power to tax and spend is used
to provide financial inducements to the states to exert their re-
served powers in the furtherance of the legitimate objectives of
national expenditure....
It is this last type of National-State cooperation, effected by
means of the federal grant-in-aid, which best realizes the ideal
of Cooperative Federalism. By this device there is brought about
a real mergence of powers and a real reciprocity of service for
common ends, on the part of the two governmental centers.3 2
A. NEw FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION
Corwin's new emphasis on federal-state cooperation, of course,
differed from his 1923 thesis that Congress had direct power to
legislate for the national welfare. However, the Supreme Court
had a year before partially accepted this earlier position of his
29 Aug. 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 620, now generally dispersed throughout 42
U.S.C. including grants to the states for: old age assistance, §§ 301-
306; and to dependent children, §§ 601-606; maternal and child wel-
fare, §§ 711-715, 721; and aid to the disabled, §§ 1351-1354 (1958).
30 Note 5, supra.
31 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
32 Corwin, National-State Cooperation its Present Possibilities, 46 YALE
L. J. 599, 622 (1937). Cf. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IOWA
L. REV. 459 (1938). For cooperation in reverse, with reference to the
Commerce Clause, see Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242
U.S. 311 (1917); Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its
Interstate Character, 55 MVINN. L. REV. 100, 253 (1920-21); Dowling,
Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 547, 552, fn. 19 (1947).
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in United States v. Butler,33 still apparently being of the opinion,
however, even with respect to the congressional tax and commerce
powers, that there was some area of jurisdiction reserved to the
states under the tenth amendment, and very definitely accepted
it in 1941 when one of the Child Labor Cases, supra, was over-
ruled.34 Thus, the American subsidy system historically estab-
lished the right of the federal government to participate in welfare
matters, and once that right became ascendant, became theoretically
the only remaining means whereby the states could function when
such matters were deemed affected by the national interest. And
possibly in appreciation of this, Corwin, in his final analysis, placed
his emphasis on federal-state cooperation which permitted the
states to participate in the solution of national problems.
In any event even with the Social Security Act sustained, the
basis of its constitutionality was still obscure as to whether or not
it had been upheld because of its cooperative features, and there
still remained a lingering notion that there was yet an area re-
served to the states upon which the government could not encroach
without their participation. As a consequence, this form of "Co-
operative Federalism" again became dominant over the alternative
of direct federal action, an alternative induced by the depression.3 G
It was defined by Henry Bittermann, in a pioneer volume published
in 1938, which demonstrated that it was the traditional method
that is followed not only in federal-state relations but in state-
local relations as well:
By a grant-in-aid is here meant a payment made by a central to
a local authority to defray part of the cost of a service administered
by the local authority, usually subject to some conditions set by
33 United States v. Butler, note 31 supra. This case declared the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31 (legislation which sought
to enlist the voluntary cooperation of the individual rather than the
state), unconstitutional in that it attempted to regulate agricultural
production which the Court held was a matter reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment. The Court, however, acknowledged that
the Congressional power to tax for the general welfare is not con-
fined to areas within the enumerated powers, in an analysis at pp.
64-67 which closely paralleled Corwin's 1923 argument, notes 9 and
11, supra.
34 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer v.
Dagenhart, notes 5 and 10 supra. This case holds that it is no ob-
jection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce
that its exercise of the police power of the states, id., 114; cf. Bow-
man v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Leisy
v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) and note 66 infra.
85 Report, op. cit. supra, note 16, at 33.
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the central government, which may inspect and partially control
the service and, if conditions are not satisfactory, withhold future
payments of the grant.36
While Bittermann wrote a definitive study in the field, and his
conclusions defended the system, he warned that they were based
on theory and must await their proof until more extensive studies
were made.3"
One such study was made in 1940. In that year the American
Academy of Political and Social Science devoted an entire volume
of its "Annals to intergovernmental relations in the United States,
the first three articles of which relate to federal-state relations.3 8
In the opening article,3 9 the potential of a vast administrative hier-
archy was noted if the then current trend to overall treatment
by the federal government of welfare problems was pursued in
subsidy administration.40  The writer predicted4 ' that the Office
of the President, since it united politics and administration would
become dominant, and that public control could only be exercised
in the political party as an instrument of party and consent, both
on a national and local level despite the Hatch Political Activity
Act of 1939.42
B. MASS OF FACILITATING LEGISLATION
The second article in the series remarked as to the mass of state
legislation that had been enacted to facilitate federal legislation
and apparently saw no danger in this.43 There is, however, a
danger related to the problem of responsibility noted above, that
is to say, the creation by the state of quasi-municipal entities,
36 Bittermann, op. cit. supra, note 22, at 5.
37 Id. at 3. However, a pioneer study made on the subject a decade
before MacDONALD, FEDERAL AID: A STUDY OF THE AMERI-
CAN SUBSIDY SYSTEM, did not have first-hand experience, as
Bitterman did, with the alternative of direct federal action.
38 Vol. 207, Jan. 1940.
39 Id. at 1, DURHAN, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION IN INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.
40 Id. at 4-5.
41 Id. at 6.
42 53 Stat. 1147, 5 U.S.C. § 118(k), (1958), removes from active political
activity state and local agency employees whose principal employ-
ment is in connection with any activity financed in Whole or in part
by government subsidy.
43 Key, State Legislation Facilitative of Federal Action, op. cit. supra,
note 38, at 7.
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particularly in the case of slum clearance legislation,4 4 to avoid
constitutional and charter limitations on cities, the political sub-
divisions of a state. Unrestrained administrative action between
such independent local agencies and federal agencies, both policy
making bodies remote from elective control, may violate the spirit
and purpose of the tenth amendment.45 For that amendment re-
serves power to the states or the people and if there is vitality
left in this concept, it lies in context with the Bill of Rights.
The final article of this 1940 analysis dealt with the effect of
piecemeal federal aid subsidy, i. e., - aided state services were
placed in a preferred position and other services, while equally
important, suffer because of the diversion of local funds into the
preferred services. 46 The recommended cure for this was for the
federal government to provide for all of the most expensive state
and local functions, 47 a solution it was urged would also develop
efficient professional administration.48
The culmination of these writings on what should be the
relationship of the federal and state governments took place in
44 The "Housing Authorities Law," model legislation enacted by states
desirous of obtaining federal grants and loans for public housing
under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 888-899, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1433 (1958), created commissions independent of the
usual constitutional and charter limitations on municipal corporations;
Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834
(1938); Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304
Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 665 (1939); Nashville Housing Authority v. City
of Nashville, 92 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951); People ex rel.
Stokes v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61, 101 P.2d 21 (1940). Although such
authorities have to obtain initial local approval of a particular hous-
ing project, they are responsible thereafter chiefly to the Federal
Housing and Home Finance Agency. The Housing Act of 1949, 63
Stat. 413-438, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1483 (1958), changes the emphasis,
however, in slum clearance from public housing to redevolpment
by private enterprise, and model legislation, suggested by the Di-
vision of Law, Housing and Home Finance Agency, October 12, 1956,
in respect to such redevelopment, permits a municipality to create
an urban renewal agency either as an independent commission or
as a city agency, the latter more responsive to local policy.
45 Kades, An Irrevocable Federal Subsidy: A Study of Its Legal As-
pects, 36 A.B.A.J. 97, 166-167 (1950).
46 Harris, Future of Federal Grants-in-Aid, op. cit. supra note 38, at 14,
18.
47 Id. at 20.
48 Id. at 21-26. Cf. note 85 infra.
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1943. In that year, after a review of state functions, the conclusion
of the Ross Essay was as follows:
It appears that from the foregoing paragraphs that there is no
concensus of opinion as to whether education, general relief, labor,
housing, criminal law administration, and taxation, are state or
national functions or both. This strongly suggests that the basic
function of the states in our system of government should be
cooperation with the national government. 'The alternative of
centralization is efficient cooperation.' . . . According to Pro-
fessor Corwin it is 'national-state cooperation, effected by means
of the federal grant-in-aid, which best realizes the ideal of co-
operative federalism.' . . .49
It must be observed, however, that all of the writers had now
become aware that the federal government could achieve its ob-
jectives without state help since there was no longer an area left
to the states which was unaffected by the national interest. Log-
ically then, the alternative to a strong central government was to
sponsor a program wherein the states could be integrated, admin-
istratively and financially. But assuming that there is the same
necessity of achieving uniformity in the field of welfare as there
is in commerce, 0 it is a great deal less expensive to achieve
uniform commercial regulation. However, probably because the
United States had emerged from a depression to engage in war,
and had, as a consequence, passed through an era in which the
federal government had played a dominant role, the view still
persisted as late as 1943 that complete centralization was some-
how inevitable. Illustrative of this was a report submitted that
year to the Secretary of the Treasury by a special committee on
inter-governmental fiscal relations, 51 which while professing to
seek a middle ground,52 nevertheless assumed that in the function-
al division of responsibility the question was, in any given area,
whether the government should take direct action or employ the
grant-in-aid mechanism, the latter course indicated in some in-
stances for "cordial Federal-State relations."53
III. ACTUAL IMPACT
After the War a different viewpoint began to prevail and
attention was focused, almost for the first time, on the reality of
49 Orfield, What Should Be the Function of the States in Our System
of Government? 29 A.B.A.J. 480, 488 (1943).
50 Cf. text supported by note 66 infra.
51 S. DOC. NO. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
52 Id. at 4-5.
53 Id. at 181.
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federal subsidy as it existed. This was probably with the realiza-
tion that the government could not, as theoretically assumed, per-
form even indirectly, far less directly, the functions of the states,
however those functions were affected with the national interest.
In 1949 the matter of inter-governmental relations was again re-
viewed, this time by the first Hoover Commission. The assets of
the American subsidy program were listed by this very thorough
but brief analysis as follows:
1. Services have been provided which many states would
have been unable to supply and there has been some
redistribution of resources from states that have super-
ior means to those that lack them.
2. The level of all aided services has been raised without
transferring functions entirely to the national govern-
ment, this accomplished by a division of functions: the
government giving aid and establishing broad stand-
ards, the states sharing the burden and retaining pri-
mary administration.
3. The activities of state governments have expanded with
these additional resources enabling them to embark on
additional and more public service programs.
4. There had taken place a satisfactory stimulus in state
government and
5. Improved professional administration. 54
The liabilities in fairness were also reported, but this time
not on the tacit assumption that state government was somehow
obsolete:
1. No one agency concerned with the overall impact has
been developed.
2. Large areas of discretion, policy making, ultimate re-
sponsibility and control for public services, are in the
government.
3. Unaided programs have been neglected.
4. National taxation has been expanded for the aid pro-
gram to the states and for war purposes to such an
extent that there has been an invasion of tax sources
which could be used for state and local governments.
5. States are rewarded which avoid responsibility and
those which accept it are penalized.5 5
54 The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Gov-
ernment, overseas administration-federal states relations-federal re-
search, A Report to the Congress, at 30-31 (March, 1949).
55 Id. at 31-32.
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The recommendation was for a continuing agency on federal-
state relations, 6 a significant recommendation in view of the
commission's responsibility to recommend measures for efficiency
in government. It is interesting to note, moreover, in view of the
earlier writing predicting the necessity of centering political re-
sponsibility in the President,57 that another recommendation made
by the Commission for a new Department for Social Security and
Education eventually became a reality 58 and Indian affairs, tradi-
tionally thought purely a federal function, is progressively trans-
ferred, whatever the wisdom of this may be, to state governments
through the media of this Department."0
A. FEDERAL Ai) SURvEY
In 1949 the Council of State Governments also presented a
study of federal-state relations undertaken by a committee headed
by Governor Earl Warren. To obtain an over-all picture of the
views of state officials who administer federally aided programs,
a questionnaire was again developed. This questionnaire and the
major percentage of response were as follows: 60
1. Have federal grants stimulated state activity
with respect to the aided program? 93.8 Yes.
2. Has federal supervision improved states stand-
ards of administration and service? 70.3 Yes.
3. Has federal assistance led to an interference
in state affairs? 64.2 No.6 1
56 Id. at 36.
57 Notes 38, 39, and 42 supra.
5 8 Although the Commission recommended a separate United Medical
Administration, Social Security-Education-Indian Affairs, A Report to
the Congress, March 1949, at 4, the Public Health Service was also
integrated under the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, a
Cabinet post created by the Act of April 1, 1953, 67 Stat. 18, 5 U.S.C.
§ 623 (1958).
59 See Report, note 58 supra, at 65, 71.
60 See Report, note 16 supra, Appendix A, p. 273.
61 There was virtually no change in opinion on questions (1) and (2)
since the earlier questionnaire in 1928, note 25 supra, but the per-
centage of those answering yes to question (3) had increased. That
the percentage had not gained further, in view of greatly increased
federal activity, is the surprising result. Moreover, the dissatisfac-
tion of state officials in 1948, as the council points out at p. 281, was
chiefly derived from the employment security group where federal
aid to administration is 100%.
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4. Should federal appropriations for existing
grant programs be increased or decreased? 77.6 Increased
5. Should the system of federal grants be
expanded? 51.6 Yes.
6. Does federal aid tend to unbalance overall
state programs? 69.1 No.
7. Should federal aid funds be budgeted and
subject to the same financial controls as are
state funds? 87.8 Yes.
8. Are existing provisions relative to the match-
ing of funds satisfactory? 73.9 Yes.
9. Are existing provisions relative to the oppor-
tionment of funds among the states satis-
factory? 68.6 Yes.
10. Are existing provisions relative to the alloca-
tion of funds among the various portions of an
aided program satisfactory? 78.0 Yes.
The favorable evidence of this 1949 questionnaire seems to
be also sustained by that of the President's Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations whose findings were made public in 1955.12
This report, the most comprehensive study ever made on the
actual workings of the federal grants-in-aid, found for the most
part 63 that the federal system was still in a healthy state of affairs:
The continuing vitality of State and local governments affords the
most solid evidence that our federal system is still an asset and
not a liability. To be sure it is not a neat system, and not an easy
one to operate ... 64
The Commission supported the grant-in-aid device as a vital
part of that system, saying that in the field of service, as opposed
to that of regulation, the choice between direct national action
and joint effort favors the latter. 3 Various considerations affect
this choice, principally that variation and accommodation are
here more important than uniformity, indeed are the ingredients
of efficiency, and that such a course promotes the vitality of state
government rather than would extensive national performance
of a program or segment of a program.66
62 A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress, June, 1955.
63 Notable dissent came from the Commission's Vice-Chairman, former
Governor Alfred E. Driscoll of New Jersey. See The Biggest Con
Game in Politics, Reader's Digest, December, 1956, and January, 1957.
64 Report, op. cit. supra note 62, at 2.
65 Id. at 67.
66 Ibid.
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B. IMPACT STUDIES
The Commission's findings were supplemented by two sets
of impact studies.6 7 The first of these covered twenty-five states,
states of wide geographical distribution and of great range as to
size and population, wealth and income, the type of economy -
whether chiefly industrial or agricultural, and in constitutional
and governmental arrangement. In nine of these federal grants
exceeded 20% of the amount raised by state and local taxation,
and, at the other end of the scale, there were three where grants
were 10% or less of such revenue. While such a study produced
a variety of results since it covered a nation wide operation of
the American subsidy system, general conclusions could be reached.
First, it was discovered, with reference to the executive branch
of state governments, that the impact of federal aid is less than
might have been expected, although "strong" governors complain
more about federal dictation than do "Chief Executives, not masters
in their own house."68  It was also concluded that overall state
administrative reorganization has neither been helped nor hindered
by federal aid, but that reorganization of a particular function has
been helped by the federal "single agency" requirement.6 9 Like-
wise, federal grants do not prevent the introduction and use of
a good executive budget system, although, because of their minute
categorization, they complicate the budget.70 Finally it was noted
that the political rule of the governor was enhanced rather than
weakened by such aid,7' and that in general the relations between
federal agencies and their state counterparts were excellent.7 2
07 (1) A Survey Report on The Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid on
Structures and Functions of State and Local Governments, submitted
to the CoMnission on Intergovernmental Relations (June 1955);
(2) Summaries of Survey Reports on The Administrative and Fiscal
Impact of Federal Grants-in-Aid, prepared tfrom Original Survey Re-
ports Submitted to the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(June 1955).
68 Impact Report (1), note 67 supra, at 5-6.
69 Id. at 6. This concept, which requires administration of a particular
federal program by a single state agency was apparently used to
oppose reorganization in some states. The Council of State Govern-
ments urges, however, that there is nothing in this requirement that
prevents over-all budgetary control. See Report, op. cit. supra note
16, at 124-125.
70 Impact Report (1), note 67 supra, at 7.
71 Id. at 7-9.
72 Id. at 9.
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Next discussed is the impact on the State Legislature.73 Here
it was discovered that federal grants have produced shifts in state
policies both in the introduction of services which would not have
been undertaken without such grants, and in the beginning of
functions sooner and more extensively than could have been other-
wise the case. But most significant of all, in view of earlier re-
ports that had pronounced it a major defect 7 4 it was found that
non-federally aided functions had not been "conspicuously neg-
lected", although in poorer states the claims of some non-aided
functions do not have as high priority.75
The second set of impact studies dealt with seven additional
states, states which presented the same range and variety as the
twenty-five states surveyed in the first report. In the first of
these states, Connecticut, it was found that since aid is not limited
to need, generally less expenditure was recommended particularly
as to the larger grants.76 In Kansas, on the other hand, less fed-
eral direction was recommended. For while it was acknowledged
that federal subvention had greatly stimulated the legislature to
enact "Little Hoover" reorganization, legislation which included
executive budgeting of federal funds, it was felt that the state
had reached such a point that federal fiscal and administrative
controls should be exercised by specific policy statements and
not through detailed administrative regulations. 77 In Michigan,
grants-in-aid accounted for only slightly over 10% of the total
revenue, and here it was found that the organizational structure
was influenced relatively little by federal grant programs. Again
there was some irritation on the part of state officials as to the
failure of federal auditors to recognize the overall adequacy of
state financial controls.78 By way of contrast, Mississippi reported
that federal aids stimulated the establishment and development
of needed governmental services, which otherwise would not have
been provided. And it was reported that this had been achieved
without unduly impairing the independence of local officials; and,
indeed, that the federal program had supported such officials' own
efforts to raise standards. 79 South Carolina, another southern state
73 Id. at 11.
74 See notes 46 and 55 supra.
75 Impact Report (1), note 67 supra, at 11-12.
76 Impact Report (2), note 67 supra, at 1, 5 and 8.
77 Id. at 16 and 25.
78 Id. at 35-37.
79 Id. at 45. Cf. Helm, Federal Kickbacks to the States, Am. Mercury
83: 75, 78, July 1956, wherein it was assumed that since Mississippi
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with a strong tradition of states rights, however, advocated the
system of block grants, - i. e., unconditional grants, but in general
reported satisfaction with prevailing grant requirements.8 0 The
State of Washington went a step further and reported similarly
to Connecticut in advocating eventual withdrawal of many federal
activities. 8' Wyoming, the last state in this survey, reported that
standards required by federal regulation have influenced the de-
velopment of balanced programs, and that, with few exceptions,
state officials have readily accepted and expanded such standards
which have increased uniformity in operation and administration.8 2
IV. CONCLUSION
The actual impact then seems to be varied but on the whole
generally favorable, and may the same be said for the various
alternatives? One such alternative is that the government return
to the early day unconditional grants, this based on the argument
that a state should be left to itself, in terms of local autonomy, to
determine the incidence of national largesse. But such a course
would not remove the pressure to develop national projects, which
as in the case of Australia and Canada would lead to the super-
imposition of such projects on the block grants without any econ-
omy and probably with more extravagence. 8 3
Another alternative would be in terms of centralization - i. e.
direct achievement by the government of its objectives without
any recourse to the states. But this would be the most extravagant
course of all8 4 and bigness reaches the point of diminishing returns
as the first Hoover Commission has suggested.8 5  An alternative
,received back a disproportionate share of the federal tax dollar, this
involved federal dictation. Very often, the poorer states contain the
most federal tax-exempt domain. Morley, States Rights Dwindle as
Land Control Increases Federal Government Powers, Nation's Busi-
ness 44:21, April 1956.
80 Impact Report (2), note 67 supra, 68, 74.
81 Id. at 81-82, 92.
82 Id. at 108.
83 See Report, op. cit. supra note 16, at 122.
84 The Council of State Governments in analyzing this alternative con-
cludes: "Far from reducing federal expenditures, this would add
new billions of dollars to the national budget to say nothing of its
effect on our federal system of government." Id. at 92.
S5 Concluding report, May 1949, at 37: "As a general rule, economy
can be achieved in administration by centralizing services common
to all agencies. There is a limit, however, in the size and complexity
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opposing this, of course, is that the states should perform their
functions without any help from the government. But it seems
inequitable in a modern economy to base these functions entirely
upon the tax structure of the states, a tax structure more suited
to an agrarian than an industrial economy. Finally, there is the
approach of the theoretical writers, who, following the lead of
Corwin, envisioned that the federal government could and should
legislate for the public welfare, but principally through the states,
extending federal subsidy and controls to the major functions of
those governments. However, as it developed, this alternative to
the threat of direct federal action became unnecessary" and, more-
over, such an approach would reduce the states to mere adminis-
trative provinces of the central government, even if it were as-
sumed that the national budget could stand such a program in
view of the continuing war threat.
In contrast to these various alternatives, the American subsidy
system as it actually has evolved, seems particularly appropriate
and particularly American.8 7 It originated even before the Consti-
tution was adopted 8 and has continued ever since. And while in
a time of crisis some urged complete centralization and others,
fearing this, posed the alternative of state participation, an alter-
native, however, which in terms of theoretical efficiency involved
subsidation of most of state services, the solution that actually
developed was decidedly piecemeal.8 9 Such a program may have
of Government beyond which it is no longer feasible to furnish serv-
ices centrally without creating serious bottlenecks, delays, and con-
fusion. As a result, the services become more costly and less effic-
ient than if performed by the agencies themselves.
"This point has long been reached in the operations of the Fed-
eral Government."
86 Note 35 supra.
87 See Bittermann, op. cit. supra notes 22 and 36.
88 See Report, op. cit. supra note 16.
89 See e.g., federal aid programs for: land grant colleges, note 19 supra;
agricultural extension work, note 21 supra and 20 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15(1958); trade, home economics and industrial subjects, 20 U.S.C. §§ 13,
15 (1958); practical nursing, 20 U.S.C. § 15 (aa) (1958); schools over-
burdened by federal activity, 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1958); state con-
ferences on education to provide for White House Conference, 20
U.S.C. § 331 (1958); wildlife, 16 U.S.C. § 777 (1958); watershed pro-
tection and flood prevention, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1007 (1958); federal
highway program, note 24 supra; state homes for disabled veterans,
24 U.S.C. § 134 (1958); shore construction, 33 U.S.C. § 426(e) (1958);
sewerage treatment works, 33 U.S.C. § 466(d) (1958); public health
including grants to the states for purposes of mental health, 42 U.S.C.
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its disadvantages, but these are not as serious as believed ° and the
advantage is that subsidy has become merely a stimulus to, rather
than a taking over, of the functions of the states. Moreover, most
significant of all as the actual studies reveal, where there is a
highly functioning state government, the trend is to seek curtail-
ment of federal aid rather than increase.91 Thus the Yankee in-
genuity for compromise has avoided the consequences of the ex-
tremes.
§ 242(a) (1958), for the prevention, control and treatment of various
diseases, § 246, and the construction of adequate state hospitals, § 291;
social security, note 29 supra; low-rent housing, slum clearance and
farm housing, note 44 supra; public works, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1496
(1958); school lunch programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1760 (1958); dis-
aster relief, 42 U.S.C. § 1855 (1958); public airport development, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1119, 1181 (1958); armed -force reserve facilities, 50
U.S.C. § 882(c) (1958); and civilian defense, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2281
(1958).
90 See notes 74 and 75 supra. The endless adjustment in federal-state
relations is reflected in the current debate noted by the Committee
on Education Beyond the High School in its First Report to the
President at p. 10 (Nov. 1956), and in that between the United States
Chamber of Commerce and the Secretary of Health Education and
Welfare over the extent of the matching program necessary to pro-
vide for the alleged shortage of classrooms in the primary and
secondary schools, see Roger Stuart, Aid to Education Hits Snag,
Washington Star, March 13, 1957.
91 Notes 76 and 81 supra.
